INTRODUCTION
“Never pull down a fence until you know why
it was put up” -Robert Frost1
In Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 2 the late eminent scholar Friedrich
August von Hayek (1899-1992), and what some deem the “Austrian revival,”3
arguably begins and conceivably concludes a genuinely, original discourse
concerning the taxis and cosmos (Kosmos)4 of institution building. A neglected
aspect of Hayek’s contribution to the science of law (jurisprudence) may be his
discourses on rules and order, and the sources of power. For this reason, this
article primarily focuses on Hayek’s Law, Legislation, and Liberty and his
discourse on taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and spontaneous order, and not other aspects
of this writing or other writings. Because in this respect, his contribution to legal
scholarship stands apart and risk being neglected by many, especially Law,
Legislation, and Liberty. 5 In understanding modern Western development
taxonomies, Hayek’s contributions, albeit arguably inadvertent to the
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understanding of institution building, constitution building, inclusive, remain
relevant today,6 but are still for the most part seemingly ignored and neglected.
As one source notes, “Yet despite the ultimate vindication of his work by a
Nobel Prize in 1974 and the discrediting of both socialism and Keynes, the man
who predicted it all so very long ago remains largely ignored, at least in the
America that was for some time his home.” 7 No one better understood than
Hayes did the link between economic freedom and political freedom, and liberty
and civilization. 8 In the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher when planning for her
revolution thumped down a copy of Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty before a
group of Tory researchers, expounding, “This is what we believe.” Only a year
earlier in 1998, in Beijing, though earlier banned, a new Chinese translation of
The Constitution of Liberty became a best-seller, with a subsequent conference
attracting a veritable Who’s Who of Chinese dissidents.9
In Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek dissected the inner workings of
institution building and constitution building in that by subtle and meticulous
piecemeal fashion he presented for us the essential cogs and wheels of requisite
rules and sources of order for a functioning society vis-à-vis spontaneous order in
antiquity and modernity. These meticulous revelations also lend understanding to
contemporary problems of institution building and constitution modeling,
especially for those non-Western cultures and nation-states currently undergoing
institutional and constitutional reform such as the People’s Republic of China
(China), Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nation-states. In terms of Western
institution building, institution building can be generally categorized as institution
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building prompted by either military force or non-military force that is by the
forces of politics, economic, military, or combination thereof.
Hayek’s discourse also lends understanding to an evolving international
law, as manifest in the appearance of increasingly more international law bodies
and international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the European
Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS)10 and Mercosur (South
American Common Market, Mercado Comun del Cono Sur or Southern Cone
Common Market).11 In terms of IGOs, a prime example of evolving international
law is the World Trade Organization (WTO).12 Hayek’s discourse equally lends
to assisting us in understanding the WTO as a world constitution for global trade.
If the WTO as representative of a world constitution for global trade embodies
positive law, if not international law legal positivism, 13 then supposed legal
borrowing pursuant to policies and goals of institution building may negatively
affect both donors and recipients. However, and most importantly, Hayek’s
discourse helps us to understand and possibly resolve problems attendant to the
transplant, integration and evolution of Western law in non-Western cultures and
nation-states such as China, Afghanistan, Iraq and other nation-states.
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In addition, as previously mentioned there is the problem of institution
building by force and coercion, generally brought about by military and nonmilitary impetus. Western developed nation-states have employed political,
economic and military power pursuant to goals of institution building.
Notwithstanding problems attendant to a mixture of part market systems and part
commands systems,14 and problems of neo-imperialism,15 institution building by
force and coercion complicates this issue while further attenuating the problem.
Although presenting more so a problem of international relations, Hayek’s
discourse may also lend itself to possibly understanding and resolving the use of
force and coercion in institution building in that his discourse offers alternative
international relations policies in goals designed to transplant Western
institutional designs in non-Western cultures and nation-states.
For purposes of this article, institution building is considered within a
broad context. Ugo Mattei generally described three historical patterns, or models,
for transplanting law in intended recipient countries. “A first model is direct
imperialistic/colonial rule, or imposition of legal patterns by military force.”
Classic examples are military conquest such as the Napoleonic Code imposed in
Belgium and McArthur's reforms in post-World War II Japan. A second model is
imposition by bargaining such as acceptance of a legal model by a sort of subtle
blackmail. In order to gain access to international markets, nations change their
laws according to Western standards. Examples can be seen in China, Japan and
Egypt. This is the way IGOs such as the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), WTO and EU effect change in developing countries. A third model
is fully consensual, and is presented “as diffusion by prestige, focusing on a
deliberate process of institutional admiration that leads to the reception of law.”16
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As previously mentioned, for our purposes institution building includes
constitution building, or constitution modeling for developing countries and
economies such as in the present case of Iraq. Moreover, given a greater breathe
in definitional meaning; institution building equally encompasses the changing
role of international law as it arguably strives to transform itself into a more
transnational law. A prime example of the latter role of changing international
law can be seen in the force of the dynamics of WTO accession. It is here that
China presents a classic example because of its on-going legal and economic
reforms, or institutional reforms, that are prompted, at least in part,17 by both the
Protocol on Accession and Trade Review Mechanism (TRM).18 While economic
in nature, rather than military, the ultimate effect of accession to the WTO has
meant for China institution building prompted by non-military impetus, which is
political and economic, rather than by military impetus as seen in the case of
Iraq.19 Regardless of impetus employed, the result remains the same in both the
cases of China and Iraq. Both countries and other developing countries are in the
midst of institution building, including constitution building, which is for the most
part dictated on Western terms of development and by Western theories of
development. 20 The latter begs the question of whether democracy can be
imposed on a country from without.21
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In terms of a broad definitional meaning, the ambit is diverse and wide,
ranging from seeking assistance from Bretton Woods institutions22 as in the case
of China to proposed democratic elections under military (marshal) law as in the
case of Iraq. The overriding commonality confronting non-Western cultures,
developing countries, and economies are the conflicts of Western international
law, Western rule of law and especially Western institution building.
This article explores Hayek’s postulations concerning both taxis and
cosmos, in terms of understanding institution and constitution building.
Specifically this article analyzes the importance of his contributions to
understanding institution and constitution building in non-Western cultures and
developing countries and economies.
Part I of this article begins by addressing, in terms of Ugo Mattei’s
generally described historical patterns, why China presents an instance of
institution building by bargaining, while countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan
offer instances of institution building by military force. Next, this article
addresses Hayek’s discourse on rules and order, by discussing sources of power in
terms of taxis and cosmos (Kosmos), in conjunction with notions of deliberate
design and spontaneous order.
Part II of this article analyzes the issues of taxis and cosmos in terms of
both contemporary application and problems. This article discusses the issues of
taxis and cosmos in terms of institution and constitution building, and in the
context of institution building prompted by military and non-military impetus, or
by politics, economics and military force and coercion. In doing so, this article
will juxtapose Western institution building models with economic, political and
legal particularities of non-Western institutions with emphasis directed toward
institutional and constitutional reform and an evolution of Western law in nonWestern cultures and developing nation-states, such as, China, Afghanistan and
Iraq. In conclusion, this article discusses the importance of Hayek’s contributions
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to the field of institution and constitution building, and the possibilities that may
stem from Hayek’s discourse for new directions in Western institution building,
constitution building and international relations.
I. INSTITUTIONS AND SPONTANEOUS ORDER
A. Institution Building by Bargaining
China is an example of Western institution building by non-military means.
China is in the midst of economic and legal reform. The commencement of these
reforms is generally attributable to the Deng Xiaoping era.23 They are economic
and legal reforms that respectively date the Deng Xiaoping era and China’s entry
into the WTO. The significance of reforms in light of its entry into the WTO is
the influence of WTO membership on both past and present reforms, especially
implementation of rule of law.
In terms of international law and politics, the most vexing issue
surrounding China’s entry into the WTO has been the implementation of rule of
law. A problem for China and non-Western nation-states is that rule of law is a
legal concept of Western origin, as equally true of international law. The WTO is
an IGO serving as a constitution for global trade, grounded in Western
international law and reflecting its Western origins and Western norms.24
This presents a problem in constitution modeling. The United States’
constitution has been hailed as a world model for constitution writing nationstates.25 Despite economic and cultural variants stemming from its use as a model
for world constitutionalism, it still survives as a model against which to measure
constitutionalism, at least in terms of Western political economy constitutional
designs. This poses problems for non-Western nation-states such as China that
are undergoing process of amendments and revisions of constitutions for the
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purpose of seeking compliance with WTO reforms via Protocol on Accession,
especially requirement of implementing rule of law.26
The distinctiveness of China lies in fact that accession follows the 1991
breakup of the Soviet Union and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON or CMEA), which was the economic and trading system of East
European countries connected to the Soviet Union.27 The breakup of the Soviet
Union created possibility of additional transition economies seeking GATT
membership. Because rules of accession for China would serve as a model for
additional transition economies, Western developed countries implicitly created
special conditions and rigorous accession terms for China.28
The WTO is the most legalized, if not judicialized, IGO.29 Presently, the
WTO Protocol on Accession mechanism is being used to engage institution
building in non-Western developing nation-states such as China. In terms of
IGOs such as the WTO, 30 and the original goals and policies of the Bretton
Woods institutions31 one finds institution building being attempted by means of
economic and political coercion, rather than by military force and coercion.
Another example in terms of China may well be America’s use of economic and
political coercion in addressing the China yuan controversy, which is a U.S. –
China trade controversy.32
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The United States, in conjunction with other Western dominant powers,
effects Chinese institution building, constitution building, inclusive, via the WTO
and its Protocol on Accession mechanism33 and TRM.34 The process of engaging
institution building in especially China has been enhanced by the TRM.35 China's
2001 accession to the WTO was not the culmination of the transformation of its
trading system and accession obligations. Other WTO members assessing that
China needed to accomplish substantial changes over a period of years before it
would be in full compliance with all of the WTO obligations established an
annual monitoring mechanism, which focused on China's compliance progress
with its WTO commitments.36 In the Protocol on Accession, China agreed to an
annual review of the implementation process.37 The Protocol on Accession also
refers to this annual process as the TRM. Commenced in 2002, the TRM will
operate for eight consecutive years followed by with one final review of China's
compliance and implementation process in the tenth year subsequent to
accession.38
B. Institution Building by Military Force
Prime examples of institution building, including constitution building, by
military force and coercion are arguably demonstrated by the cases of
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Afghanistan 39 and Iraq, 40 especially in their bid for democratically elected
legislatures. In both cases institution building, constitution building, inclusive,
was prompted by military impetus. In terms of success or failure, it is hoped that
democratic elections in Afghanistan will be hailed as a model of success that Iraq
will subsequently follow.41
Admittedly, there are pundits subscribing to a theory that an America-led
war, in conjunction with coalition forces, against Iraq is illegal in terms of
international law. The latter presents issue of whether war against Iraq, especially
for purpose of institution building, is illegal under the principle of justum bellos,42
if not jus ad bellum (just war). Nonetheless, a problem for these pundits is that a
so-call international law community, the United Nations (UN), arguably
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sanctioned and authorized war against Iraq.43 On September 12, 2001, President
Bush announced the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive first strike, 44 which the UN
General Assembly and Security Council arguably authorized by resolution.45 The
issues surrounding principle of justum bellos are necessarily related to the legality
of Western institution building in non-Western cultures and nation-states,
especially when the impetus for reconstruction is military force and coercion.
A problem of an American-led war against Iraq directly relates to issue of
purposeful Western institution building. An issue still in dispute is whether the
Bush Administration entered office with an original intent of institution building
in Iraq, that is, determined to effect a change in the governmental regime of Iraq.46
In 1998, The Project of the New American Century, an organization comprising
prominent citizens, requested that President Clinton “enunciate a new strategy that
would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world.
That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime
from power.” Some of those signatories were Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who become senior
cabinet members in the Bush Administration.47 In terms of institution building by
military impetus, war may well be what Carl von Clausewitz described over one
hundred and seventy-five years ago as a “continuation of politics (Politik) by
other means.”48
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C. Taxis and Cosmos (Kosmos)
“[I]t is the concepts and the views held by
individuals which are directly known to us and
which form the elements from which we must
build up, as it were, the more complex
phenomena...” - Hayek (1952)49
The contributions of Hayek to the field of law and other disciplines are
many and lasting. Many rank him among the greatest members of the Austrian
school, and as one of the leading economists of the twentieth century. His work
remains influential in the areas of business-cycle theory, comparative economic
systems, political and social philosophy, legal theory, and even cognitive
psychology.50
The writings of Hayek, in particular, Law, Legislation, and Liberty,
engage us, yet, while in the same moment distracts us to no end. It is perhaps for
this reason he described himself as a puzzler or muddler, rather than the heir
apparent master of his subject.51 Nonetheless, he remains the perceptible genius
because of his writings and the continuing influence of his writings. Hayek,
through his writings, continues to influence discourses in modern society. He also
continues to reveal himself in different disciplines, subtle forms and ideas. The
most obvious of which are his discourses on taxis and cosmos (Kosmos).
In terms of societal rules and order, Hayek discerns that prevailing
scientific and political views are contingent on a particular conception of the
formation of social institutions. The latter is labeled constructivist rationalism,
which is a concept assuming that all social institutions are, and ought to be,
products of deliberate design. This contention manifests an intellectual tradition
that he deems false in its factual and normative conclusions. The latter is true
because “all” institutions are not “all” the products of design. It is an erroneous
view reflective of an intellectual tradition that connects with a false conception of
the human mind as an entity positioned outside the cosmos of nature and society.
Rather, he perceived the human mind as being the product of the same process of
evolution that society’s institutions are due.52
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In terms of constructivist rationalism, Hayek distinguished between two
schools of thought, both constituting a form of rationalism: evolutionary (critical)
rationalism and the erroneous constructivist (naïve) rationalism. 53 A critical
concern for him is the assumptions upon which constructivist rationalism is based.
For Hayek, factually false assumptions challenge a host of scientific and political
doctrinaires, such as, legal positivism, unlimited sovereign power, utilitarianism,
sociology and other schools of thought, including the social contract theories
(contractarianism) of the Enlightenment era.
When Montesquieu and the framers of the American Constitution
articulated the conception of a limiting constitution that had grown up
in England, they set a pattern which liberal constitutionalism has
followed ever since. Their chief aim was to provide institutional
safeguards of individual freedoms; and the device in which they
placed their faith was the separation of powers. In the form in which
we know this division of power between the legislature, the judiciary,
and the administration, it has not achieved what it meant to achieve.
Governments everywhere have obtained by constitutional means
powers which those men had meant to deny them. The first attempt to
secure individual liberty by constitutions has evidently failed54

While announcing that the latter form of constitutionalism has failed,
Hayek still recognized that constitutionalism means limited government.55 Now,
Hayek, to use his own words, begins to puzzle and muddle us. For Hayek’s
factually false assumptions the contributing forces are not value. Rather, these
assumptions manifest a perverse misconception of the forces that made the “Great
Society” and civilization possible.56 Further writing on false assumptions, and the
problem of a polity limiting popular will without placing another will above it, he
wrote the following.
As soon as we recognize that the basic order of the Great Society cannot
rest entirely on design, and can therefore also not aim at particular
foreseeable results, we see that the requirement, as legitimation of all
authority, of a commitment to general principles approved by the general
opinion, may well place effective restrictions on the particular will of all
authority, including that of the majority of the moment.57
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It is in terms of taxis and cosmos (Kosmos) that he addressed his concerns
with problems of the order of the Great Society resting on design, which he
characterized as the problem of deliberate design.
As previously mentioned Hayek discerns between evolutionary (critical)
rationalism and the erroneous constructivist (naïve) rationalism.58 The doctrinaire,
rather than doctrine, of evolutionary (critical) rationalism maintains that
institutions serve human purposes only if such institutions have been deliberately
designed for such purposes.59 He largely deems false the belief underlying such
propositions, “that we owe all beneficial institutions to design, and that only such
design has made or can make them useful for our purpose.”60
Conversely, Hayek perceived that the doctrinaire of erroneous
constructivist (naïve) rationalism holds that a society’s orderliness that greatly
increased the effectiveness of individual action is not due solely to institutions and
practices invented or designed for that purpose. Rather, it is largely due to
respective processes of growth and evolution. These process, albeit adopted for
others reasons or by accident, are preserved since “they enabled the group in
which they had arisen to prevail over others.”61
By ‘order’ we shall thoughout describe a state of affairs in which a
multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other
that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or
temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the
rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving
correct.62

Hayek’s central thesis on sources of order, and suggested synonyms of
system, structure or patterns, concern the “made” and “grown” orders.63 The fact
of societal order is a truism because without order society would be in chaos. He
considered this requisite societal order for a functioning society to be the byproduct of combined intentions and expectations, which ultimately determine the
actions of different individuals. It is in this form that order manifests in social life,
and presents the critical question of how such an order comes about.64
For Hayek, the answers are found in the sources of order. He addressed
the notion of deliberate design such as “a deliberate arrangement by somebody.”
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It is a concept suffering disfavor by friends of liberty and supposedly favored by
authoritarians. The authoritarian concept is based on the belief that order can only
be created by forces external to the system (exogenously). Conversely, it has no
application to an equilibrium created from within (endogenously) such as the
general theory of the market. Spontaneous order gravely differs from made order.
He described each kind of order as follows.65
The made order which we have already referred to as an exogenous
order or an arrangement may again be described as a construction, an
artificial order or, especially where we have to deal with a directed
social order, as an organization. The grown order, on the other hand,
which we have referred to as a self-generating or endogenous order, is
in English most conveniently described as a spontaneous order.66

He further employed classical Greek to describe the two sources of order,
namely, taxis for a made order, and kosmos (cosmos) for a grown order. The
latter, kosmos (cosmos) originally meaning “a right order in a state or a
community.”67
For Hayek’s spontaneous order, a well-functioning system was constructed
neither by deliberate design, nor by deliberate construction of exogenous forces
and endogenous forces. Throughout Law, Legislation, and Liberty, he referred to
spontaneous order in terms of the market, common law, custom, language, science,
and society.68
Historically, in earlier periods, man deemed language and even morals as
having been invented by “some genius of the past.” Generally, it is now
recognized, especially by social theorists, that they are the result or outcome of a
process of evolution, not the product of deliberate design. In terms of
spontaneous order, it is especially in the field of economics that it is observed to
engender special concerns. A classic example of Adam Smith’s expression of the
“invisible hand,” presents such a controversy because Smith described man as
being led “to promote an end which was no part of his intentions.”69 In respect,
the chaos of economic affairs may well be reflective of complete absence of
order.70
The gist of Hayek’s discourse on taxis and cosmos is that spontaneous
order cannot aim at concrete purposes, because an order “not made” does exist. A
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primary concern of Hayek was discovering why many do not readily recognize
this supposed truism.71
II. THE COSMOS OF INSTITUTION BUILDING
Assuming arguendo the new global economy manifest “made” order
rather than cosmos presents critical issue of the relationship between a possible
order “not made” in non-Western cultures and developing nation-states, and
Western institution building by developed nation-states and IGOs such as the
WTO that are dominated by developed nation-states. It also presents issue of the
consequences attaching to institution building in non-Western cultures and nationstates. Institution building, constitution building, inclusive, ultimately affects
both the donor and recipients of institution building. In terms of Hayek’s
categories of sources of order, it may negatively affect the arguable cosmos
(Kosmos) of non-Western cultures and nation-states. As for Western developed
nation-states, in terms of Hayek’s categories of sources of order, institution
building may constitute no more in reality than an exercise in political, if not neorealist or neo-liberalist, futility. Because his discourse challenged not only law in
general, but also the very foundations of Western notions of law by contending
there are factually false assumptions that challenge a host of scientific and
political doctrinaires.
Hayek’s discourse offers an alternative means of gauging the success or
failure of institution building in developing nation-states by developed nationstates. His cosmos may be predictive of success or failure in Western institution
building. A consequence of failure, to the disdain of the Western world may
produce negative consequences affecting the donors, or recipients, or both.
Moreover, it presents the critical issue of how we should define the rule of
law, and what implementation strategies will advance both incorporation of the
rule of law and a new global economy, or world order. Normative legal
positivism appears as a ready solution due to its notion that law is a set of
commands as suggested by the tradition of imperative legal positivism of John
Austin, 72 or even arguably, a Hayekian taxis by deliberate design. For John
Austin a proposition of law was true if it simply reported correctly the past
commands of a political society.73
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In the event a definition for rule of law can be contained within the
discipline of normative legal positivism or the normative positivist analysis of the
concept of law, then rule of law presents itself as a West centric concept of law
whose incorporation into non-Western cultures and developing nation-states poses
certain problems. H. L. A. Hart’s rejection of John Austin’s imperative legal
positivism arguably addressed the same problem.74 In the Concept of Law (1961),
Hart contended that the true grounds of law lie in the acceptance by the
community as a whole of a fundamental master rule, being Hart’s rule of
recognition. This rule assigns to a particular person or groups the authority to
make law.75 Therefore, rules of law are true not just in virtue of commands, but,
more importantly, “in virtue of social conventions that represent the community’s
acceptance of a scheme of rules empowering such people or groups to create valid
law.”76
It is readily apparent that the issue presented is one a clash of cultures that
is the invocation of West centric law, or rule of law, into non-Western nationstates. The earlier thesis of Samuel Huntington speaks to the same variety of
societal and cultural issues. 77 However, the issue is viewable in a different
perspective, rather than simply a clash of cultures. In terms of Hayek’s discourse,
the critical issue may very well lie in a clash of modern day taxis versus cosmos
(Kosmos). It is also a modern day taxis-cosmos conflict reflecting, to a certain
extent, what survives and remains of antiquity in both Western and non-Western
cultures and nation-states.
There are problems in defining the rule of law. Its multifarious nature has
lent to different meanings in different concepts and different legal systems. There
seems not to be a consensus on what the rule of law means, or even what it stands
against. One sources observes that rule of law has both a descriptive and
prescriptive content. “Like the concepts of ‘liberty’ or ‘equality,’ the descriptive
meaning of ‘the rule of law’ is dependent on the prescriptive meaning one
ascribes to it; in the context of complex contemporary polities there likely will be
vigorous disagreements concerning the relevant prescriptive standards at stake.”
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As a result, it has come to mean different things for different legal traditions such
as Anglo-American rule of law, German Rechtsstaat and French L'Etat de droit.78
For Hayek, the concept of law was also subject to differing interpretations,
because of differing interpretations concerning the concept of the “purpose” of
law.79 He seemingly intimated that law is a necessary condition for forming a
spontaneous order of actions. While doing so, he also announced it a difficult
concept to formulate without required explanations of order by social theory,
which was, of course, economics.80 He is again critical of Cartesian rationalism
and those that follow it.81 Because “[t]he preservation of an enduring system of
abstract relationships, or of the order of a cosmos with constantly changing
content, did not fit into what men ordinarily understood by a purpose, goal or end
of deliberate action.”82 This is necessarily true because generally law does not
serve any “purpose,” except for what he described as “countless different
purposes of different individuals.” Since law is not a “means to any purpose,” it
fit well within Hayek’s scheme of things, especially spontaneous order.83
A problem of Hayek is inklings of legal positivism. He may well have
been what he claimed not to be and not what he so strongly attested to being. In
addressing the conception of the “purpose” of law, Hayek seems to have been
balancing a need for taxis against cosmos and spontaneous order, rather than just
differing “purposes” attributable to the concept of law. Although Hayek was an
economist if one had to characterize him in terms of legal philosophies, he was
more so, than not, a legal positivist. Because in his analysis of the concept of law,
he is constantly balancing taxis against cosmos, a Kantian purposeless character
of rules against Utilitarianism’s purpose as central feature of law, and natural law
against positivism. Admittedly, he does not go to the extremes of legal positivism
such as the imperative legal positivism of John Austin, but neither does he go to
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opposite extremes of Cartesian rationalism, if not contractarianism. In this respect,
he resembled a sort of tempered positivist, perhaps in the tradition of H. L. A.
Hart. In many ways, Hayek’s taxis, cosmos, and spontaneous order, at least in
terms of methodology, bears resemblance to Hart’s primary rules and secondary
rules.
In a quest for spontaneous order, Hayek insisted upon cosmos, grown
order. However, grown order had to be refined, to a certain extent, by taxis,
“made” order, thus allowing for abstract concepts (relations) so long as they are
only defined by abstract properties.84 There are conventional or normative rules
that tell us what we ought and ought not to do. There are also rules such as the
rules of law that are the “chief instrument whereby we can affect the resulting
order.” For Hayek the rules upon which spontaneous order rest need not always
be of spontaneous origin, which are cosmos, grown order.
“Although
undoubtedly an order originally formed itself spontaneously because individuals
followed rules which had not been deliberately made but had arisen spontaneously,
people gradually learned to improve those rules; and it is at least conceivable that
the formation of a spontaneous order relies entirely on rules that were deliberately
made.” Rules of law, mostly, but not all, will be the product of deliberate design,
whereas most rules of conduct and morals will be the product of spontaneous
growth.
The spontaneous order produces a resulting order.
Particular
manifestations of rules depend on circumstances that the designers of rules did not
know and could not have known. In turn, the particular content of order reflects
circumstances known only to persons who obey the rules and apply them to facts
only they know. “It will be through the knowledge of these individuals both of
the rules and of the particular facts that both will determine the resulting order.”85
Comparatively, and methodologically resembling Hayek’s taxis and
cosmos, Hart in The Concept of Law (1961) distinguished between primary and
secondary rules. The primary rules tell us what we can and cannot do, while,
secondary rules allows for the creation, alteration and extinction of legal rules and
legal relations. 86 Hart’s secondary rules also arguably determine the future of
legal institutions, in that they reflect the importance of constitutionalism in
institutionalizing legal institutions, especially IGOs such as the WTO. The latter
also presents the problem of constitution making at the international level,
including the WTO, paralleling similar concerns of national constitutions, power
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and legitimacy (recognition).87 It is a question of power and controlling power,88
especially determining the limits and channels of political authority and legal
authority. In terms of national constitutions and constitutionalism, which applies
to international organizations such as the WTO, ultimately, power, although statecentered or domestic, is controlled by what are termed meta-rules, preconstitutional rules and meta-constitutional rules, or meta-constitutionalism and
the unwritten rules that tell us how constitutions operate. 89 Hart’s primarysecondary rules dichotomy strongly resembles Hayek’s taxis-cosmos dichotomy.
Nonetheless, when one comes to realization that law, especially rule of law,
is not merely a set of commands, a statement of the problem truly begins to take
form. A form takes shape in a definitional meaning of rule of law. A worthy
definition of rule of law is not simply a set of commands; rather it encompasses a
reality reflective of the political and economics forces in a society. Most
problematic is that given its Western origins, rule of law must necessarily be
defined within the ambit of West centric political and economic forces and
taxonomies. In this context, rule of law is best described as “neither a rule nor a
law” in that “it is generally understood as a doctrine of political morality, which
concentrates on the role of law in securing the correct balance of rights and
powers between individuals and the state in free and civilized societies.” 90
Admittedly, there are problems attendant to this definition. Assuming arguendo
this definition correctly reflects Western jurisprudence in modernity; it also
presents the critical issue of an invocation of West centric political morality into
non-Western cultures and nation-states.
The problem is further attenuated by the distinction between the reality
and the model of Western jurisprudence in modernity, especially in terms of
American jurisprudence. A model of U.S. constitutionalism is grounded in the
deliberations of the founding fathers, which is reflective of the original
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Enlightenment tradition. 91
Conversely, the reality of modern U.S.
constitutionalism reflects a watering down effect over the years that is an
evolution from original Enlightenment agenda to what one sources deems a more
“moderate” Enlightenment. 92 The assumption that the original Enlightenment
tradition is no more begs the question of what law or rule of law Western nationstates, who are dominant in international power politics, are intending to
transplant into non-Western nation-states under the auspices of IGOs such as the
WTO. American foundational values are grounded in the Enlightenment
philosophies, evolved to neo-realism, eventually, manifesting American
unilateralism, or America as the indispensable nation.93 The problem of remnants
of the Enlightenment era, as one source notes, is that “Enlightenment rationality
has been so successfully ingrained in our processes, forms, and practices, that,
ironically, we have (almost) completely lost the quintessentially Enlightenment
capacity to question.”94 Americans have come to believe in their own rationality
in a fundamentalist manner. “The rationality of the Enlightenment has become so
successful, so hegemonic, that it has become immobilized through its own
institutions.”95
As previously mentioned Hayek perceived that, an order “not made” that
is grown does exist, which he deemed a readily recognizable truism.96 Assuming
an order “not made” does exist, is this equally true in terms of non-Western
cultures and nation-states? In addition, what taxis will serve as an effective
implementation strategy for transplanting a Western constitutional design in nonWestern cultures and nation-states? The latter presents a critical problem for U.S.
constitutionalism or world constitutionalism as concerns non-Western nation91
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states, and their incorporation, transplant, or more accurately legal borrowing,97 of
the Western rule of law.
The discourse of Hayek on taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and deliberate design
challenges the legitimacy of United States constitutionalism as a model for world
constitutionalism, Chinese constitutionalism and Islamic constitutionalism.98 His
discourse challenges the very foundations of the American ideal, which are the
ideals of the founding fathers emanating from the original Enlightenment tradition.
However, the challenges of Hayek’s discourse do not necessarily evolve to a
factual responsibility for actually disreputing the original American
Enlightenment tradition. The demise of the Enlightenment tradition from its
original colonial days is arguably commenced during the gilded age of America, a
period in history marked by economic and political corruption.99 The demise of
the original colonial American Enlightenment tradition parallels a period in
American history known as the gilded age. The changes in American
jurisprudence correspond with the changing politics and economics of an
American society transitioning to a progressive era. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
arguably, the paradigmatic American legal realist may have contributed to our
transition from an original Enlightenment tradition to “moderate” Enlightenment.
In the Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote the following.
I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the
explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious
research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be
attained and the reasons for desiring them. As a step toward that ideal
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it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of
economics.100

While attributing great significance to an understanding of economics, if
not, the blending of law and economics, Holmes neither mentioned, nor perhaps
envisioned, an admixture of politics, or political science, to this societal mix.
Arguably, at the turn of the nineteenth century, he did not envision the trials and
tribulations of international law and politics, in terms of modernity, if not postmodernity,101 and its attendant political, socio-economic and legal forces.
In terms of China, this is especially true when one considers the dynamics
of Chinese politics and its history of constitutional government dating from the
Sino-British post-Opium War (1839-1842) to modernity, with its many twists and
turns, especially in terms of sovereignty and nationalism. 102 For China, this
historical journey of political growth parallels a history of international law and
trade, from the original preferential trading arrangements of the British Empire
(Opium War), 103 to the WTO and its dialectic and economic visions of world
order.104 China’s historical journal, at least in the sense of classical international
law (1648-1918)105 and modern international law, presents problems for Western
institution building such as that undertaken by the United States and other
developed countries.
In terms of distinguishable historical, cultural and legal particularities, the
situation is no less dramatic with other non-Western cultures and developing
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. One source noted that Chinese, Indian,
Egyptian and Greek civilizations manifest anachronisms in modernity, offering at
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best marginally, practical working political and legal ideologies in today’s
world.106
There are, of course, many religious, psychological, and political
reasons for this, but all of these reasons derive from a sense that so far
as the West is concerned, Islam represents not only a formidable
competitor but also a latecoming challenge to Christianity. . . . Islam
was believed to be a demonic religion of apostasy, blasphemy, and
obscurity. . . . It was as if a younger, more virile and energetic version
of Christianity had arisen in the East. . . . Only Islam seemed never to
have submitted completely to the West; and when, after the dramatic
oil-price rises of the early 1970s, the Muslim world seemed once more
on the verge of repeating its early conquests, the whole West seemed
to shudder.107

Problematic for Western institution building is that Islamic political
ideology is a worldwide phenomenon, representing a “complex iteration of
Quranic inspiration and reformist, fundamental orientation.”108
Hayek perceived the problem of institution building, especially in terms of
law, as one of a “complex relationship between values and facts.” It is a problem
of blending these values and facts, and a resulting complex social structure “that
exist only because the individuals composing them hold certain values.”
Assuming arguendo applicability to Western institution building, he further posits
in terms of proposed modifications or improvements of existing orders that, “he
[social scientist] will have to accept the values which are indispensable for its
existence, as it would clearly be inconsistent to try to improve some particular
aspect of the order and at the same time propose means that would destroy the
values on which the whole order rests.” 109 Hayek is addressing the problem
confronted by social scientists seeking to study complex social structures, which
only exist because individuals hold certain values.110
A problem of the disciples of political science, economics and law, is that
they are social sciences, if not moral sciences,111 rather than pure sciences, such as,
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engineering, physics and math. 112 Moreover, even pure science does not use
“observation or experiments in the world, but instead uses only reason and logic
in the form of non-specific generalities,” providing a “foundation in the form of
theorems or statements about what is true and what is not,” which “can be known
as certain and true for all time,” so long as “reason and logic as we understand
them remain valid.”113 Richard A. Posner assesses danger of positive economics
and positive economic theory of law as simply the opposite of reductionism,
occurring when economic analyst seeking to make simple economic models more
complex introduces additional factors such as risk aversion and information
costs. 114 The greater complexity enhances difficulty of refutation and
substantiation by empirical observation.115
Hayek made a sharper distinction, however, requiring a higher proof from
the sciences. Thus, Hayek assures us once again of the need for spontaneous
order. Admittedly, he made a distinction between the domains of private law and
public law. By doing so, he allows space for the development of “made” law in
the affairs of organizations such as governments and their IGOs. The effect of
which serves as a possible justification for the persistency and evolution of
positive law (legal positivism), despite the alleged factually false assumptions of
constructivist rationalists.
Non-Western developing countries pose distinctively different problems,
however, when considering Hayek’s postulations. The scenario of non-Western
developing countries does not fit well in Hayek’s scheme of things or his
discourse concerning taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and deliberate design. A problem is
that he does not directly address the particularities of non-Western nation-states or
civilization. Even assuming his discourse bears relevancy on the issue of nonWestern culture, it only does so indirectly.
Hayek recognized distinctive cultural traditions; however, after being
recognized they are relegated to minimal importance. While noting that some
social orders rest on complex systems of rules of conduct even among the animals
very low on the evolutionary scale, innate rules (genetically transmitted) and
learned rules (culturally transmitted) are given minimal attention.116 As opposed
to a more thorough examination of cultural tradition in terms of non-Western
civilizations, he leaves the subject minimized in importance. He wrote, “[S]o that
new rules may rapidly spread among large groups and, in the case of isolated
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groups, produce distinct ‘cultural traditions.’”117 Hayek when discussing cultural
tradition is addressing distinguishable cultural traits of Japanese macaque
monkeys, rather than individuals or persons in the sense of man on the high end of
the evolutionary scale. 118 Admittedly, he does briefly return to the subject of
culture in an epilogue to Law, Legislation and Liberty. Hart instructs us that yet
to be recognized is a present order of society that arose, not by design, but by
more prevailing effective institutions in the process of competition. Although
remaining critical of constructivist rationalism, or the Cartesian approach, he
implicitly recognized the inherent problem of culture by design. “Culture is
neither natural nor artificial, neither genetically transmitted nor rationally
designed.”119 However, in this respect, his criticism of the Cartesian approach
may be amiss because arguably a more correct interpretation of the Enlightenment
is one emphasizing the distinction separating reason from both culture and
tradition.120
In this respect, Hayek’s discourse is limiting. While being harshly critical
of constructivist rationalism and its attendant factually false assumptions, Hayek
unnecessarily, and somewhat contradictorily, contained himself within the bounds
of Western conventionalism and parochialism. The walls of his confinement are
Western ideology, Western institutions, and Western conceptions of law.
Nonetheless, his postulations still bear validity and relevance in terms of
institution building, even as regards to institution building in non-Western nationstates. His postulates do so because they both recognized and built on the
interrelationship between facts and values, and ultimately, a resulting sort of
Hegelian thesis-antithesis synthesis of facts and value to a higher plane, or higher
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synthesis.121 Hayek most importantly still addressed the problem of science and
social sciences in exploring the complex social order of humankind.
Legal positivism and natural law continue to influence mainstream
thinking in international law.122 However, legal positivism arguably has become a
more dominating force in Western international law and Western domestic law,
especially in American jurisprudence. Given Hayek’s discourse, the supposed
international law embodied, for instance, in the constitution of the WTO regime
may well survive a theoretical attack for its lack of both genuine cosmos and
spontaneous order. Nonetheless, even assuming its theoretical survival from such
attack, in the terms of the science of law, a donor WTO regime manifesting
positive law (legal positivism) still engenders problems of the transplant,
integration and evolution in the recipient domestic law of non-Western cultures
and nation-states.
This dilemma is also not readily dismissed or resolved by prevailing
international law theories of dualism and monism.123 An assumed international
positive law (legal positivism) tolerated in Hayek’s discourse under the public law
exception must still confront and integrate with the private laws of non-Western
cultures and nation-states. As a result the problem of an inevitable clash between
taxis and cosmos, and the need or lack of spontaneous order in law remains. The
theories of dualism and monism, coordination theory,124 inclusive, address issues
of legal hierarchy, which ultimately leaves in place, rather than resolving
problems of both transplanting donor laws and evolution of recipient domestic
laws of non-Western cultures and nation-states.
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Admittedly, in terms of dualism and monism, there are other viewpoints.
One source subscribes to international law as a sort of evolving, systemiccybernetic phenomena. The legal systems of individual nation-states are seen as
becoming more interconnected with international legal systems. The result is a
connectedness supposedly leading to a world or global legal system. One source,
implicitly, contends that notions of modern international law are the by-product of
an evolution from primitive law as embodied in the principle of comita gentium
(international courtesy) and pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be fulfilled)
that resulted in more complex, intricate and structured organizations such as the
UN, EU, OAS and Mercosur. As a result, there are now international legal
systems extending jurisdiction over not only nation-states, but also individuals.125
In this respect, theories of dualism and monism are considered more prevalent and
more capable of responding to the changing juridical needs of a more
international law oriented, international community.
In terms of non-Western cultures and Western institution building, West
centric taxonomies when applied to non-West-specific political, socio-economic
and legal issues, especially economic theory, because of myopic perspectives
necessarily limited by abstract theory and assumptions often calls into question
both reliability and practicability of explanation offered by the sciences to explain
real life phenomenon. 126 Assuming distinctively non-Western-uniquenesses,
assumptions employed as descriptors of unconventional economic actors such as
non-Western cultures and nations, are one-dimensional and pallid.127 Any science
void of real world observation and experiments, arguably, will neglect the
dimensions and dynamics of culture. The latter result is no less dramatic when
social sciences ignore the advent of real world observations and experiments.
Developing countries and economies in the midst of a supposed transition from
socialism to capitalism, at least in terms of an American consensus or Washington
consensus,128 presents, if not produced, the every increasing issue of an ideology
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of cultural exceptionalism. The political economy of reforms presents a scenario
of uncertain theorems for the West, in its universalistic presumptions of West
centric logic and reason, as opposed to recognition of arguably existentialistic
non-Western uniquenesses, and distinctive ontological bases in tradition.
In particular, the latter presents an impasse in advancing the original goals
of the Bretton Woods institutions such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank. It
does so because it engenders problems of both the genuine integration of
developing non-Western nation-states, and creation of appropriate norms that will
lend efficacy and legitimacy, for instance, to a WTO constitution, if not an
international legal order. In terms of WTO, without appropriate norms resulting
in an effective integration and legitimacy, the plight of non-Western nation-states
is best described as prospective post-WTO memberships that are quasi-in-nature,
rather than the more equilateral, full entitlement memberships enjoyed by
dominant Western developed nation-states. In terms of the accession mechanism,
a resolution of such issues may warrant a change in WTO, IMF and World Bank
methodologies and taxonomies, especially West centric models for development
and integration.
It is perhaps an issue of a Western evolution to an emic, instead of etic,
understanding of Sinicism, Islamism and other non-Western cultures. 129
Linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike coined the neologisms of emic and etic,
and distinguished the two as follows. 130 An emic “perspective focuses on the
intrinsic cultural distinctions that are meaningful to the members of a given
society.”131 Conversely, an etic perspective “relies upon the extrinsic concepts
and categories that have meaning for scientific observers.”132 An inherent benefit
of a non-West centric perspective is the resulting recognition of the forces of
politics and culture, especially, cultural exceptionalism. Because the concept of
emic/emit will “insists on the relationship of the observer to the data, as against an
abstract science in which the observer is somehow eliminated in principle even
when this would be impossible in fact.” 133 Kenneth Pike sought a greater
understanding of particular cultures through the intertwining of emic and emit
perspectives, not by exclusive reliance on an emit perspective.134 Pike’s perceived

129

James Lett, Excerpt from Emic/Etic Distinctions, Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology
(1996), available at http://faculty.ircc.cc.fl.us/faculty/jlett/Article%20on%20Emics%20and%20
Etics.him.
130
Lett, Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Alan S. Kaye, An interview with Kenneth Pike (The Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research, 4 December 1993), available at http://www.sil.org/klp/kayeint.htm.
134
Kaye, Id.

need for a more generalized background framework as a source of human choice
led him to note what he deemed an etic structure observable in particular cultures.
This “etic universal background pattern and emic culturally specific pattern” are
noted to be intertwined. Thus, the etic and emic are not subject to separate
treatment, or “first one, then the other,” or as “one outside the mind, the other
inside it.”135
The new millennium may well constitute a generation where a contest of
governmental models and taxonomies are arguably dependent on distinctive
cultures and economies. 136
The latter necessarily produces additional
considerations exceeding the disciplines of economics and political science,
especially West centric political economy taxonomies of neo-realism, neoliberalism, and development theory (dependency theory).
West centric
taxonomies destine developing countries and economies to a race to the proverbial
bottom, in terms of political and economic development. They do so because they
seem to condemn developing countries “to subservience or worst: to a state of
progressive impoverishment and dependence from which only prolonged struggle
or revolutionary change provides an outlet.” 137 Moreover, race to the bottom
models of globalization ultimately produces a backlash in developed economies
“as business relocation threatens jobs, wages and environmental standards.” 138
Conversely, it may true for developing countries that, “Developmentalism
resonates with Woodside’s suggestion that a ‘latecomer theory’ . . . dramatizes the
need for a strong state and a planning intelligentsia to choose the right path to
development.”139 In terms of developing countries and Hayek’s deliberate design
thesis, the latter contention may oddly translate into a justification for greater
reliance on taxis, rather than cosmos, by developing countries.
Nonetheless, in terms of transplanting Western rule of law, a greater
reliance on taxis, rather than cosmos presents problems, especially when
anticipating a genuine evolution of Western law in non-Western cultures. Social
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science theories void of real world observations and experiments will always be
based upon Western universalistic presumptions of West centric logic and reason,
a certain failing resulting in certain non-Western-based biases. A genuinely real
world observation of the plight of developing countries is one manifesting
recognition of distinctive ontological bases in tradition. Michael Foucault calls it
the “history of the present” . . . in some others “ontology of the present” . . . or
even “critical ontology of ourselves”. 140 This critical ontology of ourselves
allows an understanding of the “limitation of the present epoch,” then paves a way
to escape its impasse while also helping us in the “search for new possibilities for
the development of humanity.” In this sense, the critique understood is conceived
as an attitude, an ethos. It represents a philosophical viewpoint manifesting “what
we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”141
Distinctive ontological bases in tradition, representative of the distinctive
values and traditions of non-Western cultures constitute their histories of the
present. It is from their own distinctive ontological bases in tradition that they
will experiment with the possibility of going forward, especially in terms of
political and economic development. Most importantly, their histories of the
present will eventually evolve an appropriate constitutional design, be it nonliberal (illiberal) or liberal political economy constitutional design, or
combination of both as irredenta’s 142 partial success. As for the final resting
place for such an evolution in both law and constitutionalism, one can only
speculate to that end.
In the final analysis, the question is whether a West centric political
morality of economics and law is commensurate with a non-West centric political
morality of economics and law. This presents the critical issue of whether
Confucianism, Islamism and other culture phenomenon represent norms in these
respective modern non-Western societies. In the event, they represent no more
than what Hayed described as “articulated rules” or “descriptive rules,” rather
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than norms, 143 then the issue of distinctive cultures and values, in terms of
integrating Western taxonomies, especially rule of law, is irrelevant. In such an
event, modern debates concerning cultural values and exceptionalism have been
exercises in political futility, if not mere political rhetoric. Moreover, it may
serve to substantiate those distinctive cultural values of non-Western cultures and
nations that are supposedly grounded in foundational values constitute no more
than cliques do. Conversely, if such values genuinely portend general norms then
they remain increasingly relevant as forces of culture, if not nature, deserving
greater attention.
Michel Camdessus, former director of International Monetary Fund
(IMF),144 noted at a Financing for Development Conference, in Mexico, “If the
summit could deliver one thing, it should be extending assistance to enhance
institutional capacity in poor countries.” It is a problem of achieving year 2015
Millennium Goals, which were established at the September 2000 UN Millennium
summit of reducing world poverty. It is generally perceived that development
efforts have failed due to lack of institutional capacities to sustain economic
policies. Thus, weak institutional capacity presents a major obstacle to economic
development,145 and advancement of new world economy. The problem of weak
institutional capacities in developing countries and economies affects the original
goals and policies of the Bretton Woods institutions.146
A need for institution building has different consequences for developing
countries and economies, as opposed to developed countries and economies. For
some developing countries, one suspects that the consequence of failing to
develop adequate institutions in terms of Western taxonomies is continuing
poverty and lower standards of living. Comparatively, for developed countries a
failure of developing countries to rebuild or re-organize its institutional capacities
translates into a failure of the original goals of the Bretton Woods conference.
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The latter creates a need for developing countries and economies such as the
United States, EU and other nation-states possessing greater material sources than
developing countries to engage or promote institution building.
It is equally a problem of the means by which developed nation-states
engage institution building, constitution building, inclusive. Institution building is
typically engaged by means of political, economic and military power and
coercion. A problem of institution building in developing countries is that it has
now become almost the exclusive provenance of developed countries and
economies. This is necessarily true because developed countries and economies
possess the requisite greater material sources such as political, economic and
military power than developing countries. As a result, they are more able to
engage and promote institution building.
Moreover, development programs for institution building such as the
IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, formerly the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility, are by design of developed countries and their economists,
and are often perceived by developing countries as not being credible.
Developing countries more often than not perceive that their development
agendas are bypassed in the WTO for rules benefiting the rich and powerful, the
developed countries. It is a recurrent theme in international law and politics,
especially in the WTO.147
It is beyond dispute that the WTO is an IGO dominated by developed
countries and economies, rather than developing countries and economies such as
China. The latter problem is arguably evidenced by a recent failure in the 10-14
September 2003 Cancun trade ministry, which partly resulted from a Singaporeissues-induced division between developed countries and economies, and
developing countries and economies. 148 This growing concern of developing
countries is further evidenced by their grievances concerning the WTO General
Council’s (GC) August 1, 2004 decision on the Doha Agenda work program, the
“July package,” which was meant to restart trade negotiations following the
failed 2003 Cancun summit.149
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For developing countries, the problem of creating a level playing field has
been difficult. Moreover, international law and politics exasperate this on-going
problem. Notwithstanding infusion of politics into international law, the gravest
problem of international law is its inherent weakness. While providing an
international arena, if not international playing field for developed countries and
their power politics, it actually leaves much to desire for the plight of developing
countries and economies.
There is a seemingly American policy and consensus of institution
building, which concerns institution building in non-Western nation-states such as
China, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nation-states. However, notwithstanding
institution building itself in non-Western nations, an important tangential issue is
the use of force in institution building.
In terms of the United States, it is the problem of a historic,
Americanization of justum bellos, the “just war” doctrine,150 or the principle of
bellum justum.151 In international law and politics, American unipolarity and its
attendant unilateral exercises of military force, often accompanied by political and
economic coercion, seems to be a permanent fixture in the international arena. It
is a source of contention for many nation-states, including developed and
developing nations.152
Self-defense is not the only traditional criteria, condition and constraint
justifying war. Given the criteria, conditions and constraint of “just cause” under
jus ad bellum, war has been historically justified in order to defend one's nation,
stop a terrible moral wrong and create supposedly just institutions.153 One source
claims that the American Revolution is the first historic instance of American
institution building used as justification for war. It also presents the beginning of
the Americanization of justum bellos. The justification for the American
Revolution concerns not self-defense, rather American colonists fearing extinction
by the British. A pivotal concern of American colonists is “no taxation without
representation and self-government.” At least in terms of American policy and
consensus, this important concern provided American colonists with the requisite
criteria, conditions and constraint of “just cause” under jus ad bellum. As a result,
Thomas Jefferson enjoys a certain fame for the proposition that jus ad bellum will
allow war for institution building, be it to create or enhance institutions.154
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In terms of modern society, at least in terms of the United States, a
problem of institution building as “just cause” under jus ad bellum is its historical,
repetitive use throughout U.S. history, and eventual extension and expansion into
the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive first strike. 155 History is full of instances of
American institution building. From the American Revolution to the War on Iraq,
history provides plentiful example.
In terms of international law and politics, Hayek also offers a possible
solution to the impasse of an American policy of institution building, including
constitution building, which concerns institution building in non-Western nationstates such as China and other nation-states. Hayek’s discourse on taxis, cosmos
and deliberate design offers a possible solution to the problem of what appears to
be a perceived political necessity of an American polity that is the necessity of
militarism by an American hegemonic military power in institution building.
Hayek’s discourse on sources of power may offer America an alternative
path in international relations and international law. An alternative path that
recognizes and distinguishes “made” (taxis) from grown (cosmos) sources of rules
and order, and questions a staid practice of transplanting Western
constitutionalism in non-Western nation-states. In this respect, Hayek’s earlier
discourse in taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and deliberate design may offer a new path
for U.S. international relations simply because of an alternative taxonomy offered
via a new understanding of world constitutionalism, including constitution and
institution building. The result could be the formulation of a United States
international relations theory that could conceivably evolve into an alternative
preventive war strategy, as opposed to existing and historic theories grounded in a
seemingly evolving and expanding pre-emptive first strike doctrine.
Notwithstanding U.S. international relations, Hayek’s discourse may
equally influence international law in general. Admittedly, a nation’s intervention
into the affairs of another nation-state for explicit or implicit purpose of institution
building is far from being proscribed as jus cogens. The latter is mostly due to the
inherent weaknesses in international law, especially problems attendant to
enforcement of international norms. However, it remains plausible that such
interventions for purposes of institution building could eventually be proscribed
by rules of general international law. It is especially here that Hayek’s earlier
discourse possibly offers an impetus for an evolution in international law and
“just war.”
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Admittedly, there are several obvious problems. First, the American
historical practice of institution building arguably ranges in a period from its
American Revolution to War on Iraq. It presents a practice that is so engrained in
American political culture that it may present a particular law in terms of
international law. Moreover, in terms of President Bush’s post 9/11 Doctrine and
the possibility of instant customary international law, one source notes that the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressed in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases156 thata short passage of time is not an absolute bar to forming new rules of
customary international law. 157 In this respect, such practice that is intervention
into affairs of a nation for purposes of institution building may enjoy the status of
a legal exercise of force, albeit by economic and political coercion, and arguably
by military force, in terms of international law.
Secondly, Hayek’s critical discourse on rules and order, and deliberate
design, calls into question well engrained and established institutional principles
of an American polity. Because in America the critical concern of institution
building has experienced a growth and evolution paralleling a growth and
evolution of American politics and foreign affairs (international relations).
Moreover, Hayek’s discourse threatens an existing American polity and American
ideals, all of which necessarily forces America to rethink its national priorities,
international relations and, most importantly, its place in the international
community.
Neo-realism, neo-liberalism and dependency theory, are all West centric
taxonomies that share a commonality, in that they explicitly or implicitly pursue
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goal of institution building in non-Western cultures and developing countries. In
terms of neo-liberalism, China presents ample example. The socio-economic
environment of China begs the question of whether development is justified for
the sake of development itself.158 If the market is truly at work, then China is
suffering from Hayek’s spontaneous order, because the numbers seem to indicate
a populace suffering from the negative feedback of the market system adjusting to
its socio-economic environment.159 Moreover, there are undoubtedly countless
numbers of other such examples of the so-called negative feedback of the market
in China and other developing countries seeking to make transition to market
economy. Filipino academic and writer Walden Bello said: “Whether in the form
of Thatcherism in Britain, Reaganism in the US or structural adjustment in Africa
and Latin America, the free-market model has resulted in weak growth or
stagnation accompanied by greater income inequality, a greater percentage of the
people living under the poverty line and serious environmental damage.”160
In terms of economic theory, issues of values and ethos, if not ontological
concerns influence distribution. Because survival and growth are dependent on
human organizations, creating surpluses over immediate needs and wants.
Conversely, a new world order, or new capitalism, perhaps because of an etic-
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centered-perspective resulted in many people, especially non-Western cultures,
becoming marginalized while new economic gains went to the few.161
Perhaps neo-realism is more so a concern of international relations theory,
because when we are talking about political neo-realism, we are addressing
American militarism, or an American hegemony employing military force in
institution building.162 Therefore, if there is a negative feedback, it is perhaps a
non-economic variety not envisioned by Hayek. In terms of Iraq, Afghanistan
and other developing countries, the negative feedback has been the death of
military personnel, civilian casualties of war, poverty and other societal ills.163
Hayek in his writings is truly fighting the enemies of the Second World
War and the cold war. His writings are arguably pro-American, pro-liberal in the
sense of classical liberalism that is neo-conservatism, not of the variety of the
misuse of nomenclature “liberal” by an American democratic party, anti-socialism
and anti-totalitarianism. However, the contemporary importance of his writings
does not lie in these seemingly obvious characterizations. His contemporary
importance stems from his basic assault on the very foundations of American and
Western values, and institutions, including the institution of Western
constitutionalism. America and other Western countries and cultures share a
commonality of so-called liberal democratic values. Western institutions such as
governments and constitutions are grounded on foundational values emanating
mostly from the thoughts of the sixteenth century European intellectual thinkers
of the Enlightenment era such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. 164 Hayek
maintained that the doctrinaires of these great thinkers, the constructivist
rationalists, social contract theorists or contactarians, were grounded on factually
false assumptions. Assuming arguendo Hayek was correct, Western institutions
and values are called into question, especially Western institution building in nonWestern cultures and nation-states.
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The problems are obvious. If Hayek was correct, then Western society
must rethink its priorities and policies, if not ideologies. 165 It is especially
ideology that may warrant re-direction because “ideologies are modes of
consciousness, containing the criteria for interpreting social reality,” and thus
“they help to define as well as to legitimate collective needs and interests.”166 If
Hayek was correct, Western society must also rethink a policy of Western
institution building that intends to transplant Western institutions and Western
values into non-Western cultures and nation-states.
Moreover, Hayek’s discourse begs Western society to rethink its seeming
goal of transforming international law into a sort of transnational law that
challenges the foundations of traditional state sovereignty, which has been
strongly entrenched since the Peace (Treaties) of Westphalia (1648).167 A West
centric new world order and model presupposes agreed upon principles, if not
assumptions, embracing Western and non-Western cultures and economies.
China presents a classic example of the problem with this model of a new world
order. The principles for a new world order proposed by China substantially
differ from the vision of a new order designed by the West, especially the U.S. In
particular, China proposed two specific principles embracing the issue of
sovereignty. First, China proposed, “to adhere to the principles of mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and noninterference in each others’ internal affairs.” Second, and most importantly,
China proposed, “to adhere to the principle of the sovereignty equality of all the
countries in the world.” 168 One source noted that China, as a rising power is
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anxious about possible Western imposed values backed by Western, especially
U.S., collective intervention.169
In terms of Western institution building, one must also consider whether
this seemingly on-going evolution in international law to transnational law is endconnected, and if so, to what end.170 Because if the intended end-connection is a
greater permeation of Western institutions in non-Western cultures and nationstates, then Western society is ultimately transplanting an entity that Hayek found
to be based on the factually false assumptions of the constructivist rationalists.
The result is an end-connection, in terms of Hayek’s discourse that would equally
be based upon false assumptions, or, in short, another road that should not have
been traveled.
Admittedly, Hayek’s may have been incorrect. Nonetheless, his writing
begs Western society to consider its societal underpinnings, especially the
Western ideal of liberal democracy, its Western universalizing cosmopolitanism,
and especially Western institution building in non-Western cultures and nationstates. In terms of China, Afghanistan, Iraq and other developing countries, it
seems naïve to suggest that economic development by Western institution
building is justified by the assertion of development, simply, for the sake of
development itself.
The reality of a new world order, or global economy, necessitates that we
presuppose a purposefulness prescribing a requisite end-connection for Western
institution building. Because the resulting end-connection is deliberate design
based in part on the Bretton Woods conference; in part on the founding of the UN;
in part on the founding of the UN predecessor, the League of Nation;171 and in
part on the thesis of Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace (1853). 172 Kant
suggested a treaty of perpetual peace for republican forms of governments.
Western scholarship and authority translated Kant’s Perpetual Peace into the
169
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democratic peace thesis that democracies do not fight each other.173 The problem
of Kant’s Perpetual Peace as translated by Western authority, and in its
application by Western authority vis-à-vis Western taxonomies, is that it does not
account for the so-called illiberal nation-states, the non-Western cultures and
nation-states. It was equally a problem of classical international law (16481918)174 and perhaps a remnant manifest in modern international law.
Moreover, Hayek did not discern for us the distinctions between politics
and economics, or economics and law, nor between politics and law. The latter
also begs the question of whether he should have accomplished this feat. Because
given a failure to do so, leaves us without a hierarchy of sorts that describes
effective institution building, that is, should a polity be first built or re-built, rather
than a legal system or economic system. Most problematic are the original goals
of the Bretton Woods conference and especially that of a Western universalizing
cosmopolitanism, because Western institution building, by bargaining or military
force, is clearly based upon theories of the constructivist rationalists (Cartesian
rationalism), which Hayek maintained were based upon factually false
assumptions. It is here that Hayek challenged the West and its institutions,
especially institution building, in a very fundamental way.
Hayek does not reveal anything new to the world, rather an extension of
his earlier thesis on spontaneous order mostly concerning business-cycle theory
and comparative economic systems.175 He approached the subject of law as the
science of law (jurisprudence) in a manner resembling his approach to the science
of economics. It is a search for clarity in the obscure by means of economic
methodology, an approach seemingly contradictive of his criticism of
constructivist rationalists, or Cartesian rationalism. Perhaps it is the problem of
economic modeling and attendant general assumption that economic actors taken
individually or en masse are rational decision makers.
The formalism of Hayek in employing economic tools and a market order
to assess societal problems leaves much to desire.176 The idea of a spontaneous
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order is grounded in concepts of pure economics that searches for a world where
there are perfect market systems. Adam Smith’s argument against governmental
intervention was grounded in a philosophy of laissez faire economics that
assumed the existence of perfectly competitive markets. The two major thesis of
Adam Smith was that government should pursue a policy of laissez faire and that
the resulting distribution of income should be unequal. Albeit reality suggest
otherwise, the latter became the economic ideology of Western civilization and
culture, an ideology that Western culture has attempted to promote, if not
transplant by institution building, in non-Western cultures, and underdeveloped
and developing countries.177
So-called capitalism, if it ever actually existed, is better referred to as the
Western ideal model of economic systems. This market system experienced
profound changes beginning in the 1970s because of information technology, socalled globalization and financial deregulation.178 For Hayek, perhaps it was a
dreaded “Rousseauesque nostalgia” 179 serving as reminder of the Cartesian
approach that drove him to search for solutions in the balancing of society by the
forces of the market order.
In a perfect production environment, the forces of positive and negative
feedbacks supposedly allows a market system to act as a self-correcting system.180
However, in reality, there are the negative feedbacks that are destabilizing.181 The
problem of negative feedbacks in a real world where the target of economic
theories are nation-states consisting of humankind are destabilizing feedbacks
such as poverty, unemployment and war. In terms of nation-states such as China,
Afghanistan and Iraq, it difficult to envision positive feedbacks, as in typical
business cycles, that will ameliorate destabilizing feedbacks or vicious spirals
such as poverty, unemployment and war.
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An answer to the societal problem of vicious spirals of poverty,
unemployment and war may not lie in the science of economics such as Coase’s
Theorem, Pareto Efficiency and the Kaldor-Hicks Theory, and Public Choice and
Arrow’s Impossibility Theory. 182 Economics, not unlike law, “is a biased
undertaking in that the use of any particular economic model embraces specific
assumptions and value statements and consequently any outcome generated by the
use of such a model will be biased.”183 For Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), the
father of neoclassicism, a definition of economics had to encompass the terms of
political economy and economics. As a result, because the term of political
economy implied that economics and politics were interrelated then economics, as
a social science, was intimately connected with normative judgments. 184
Economic modeling, especially the neoclassical economic model, is based upon
assumptions reflecting these biases.185 In terms of a new world order or global
economy, there are no quick fixes to the conflicts of Western international law,
Western rule of law and especially Western institution building confronting nonWestern cultures, developing countries and economies.
Despite the shortcomings of Hayek’s spontaneous order, there is a positive
side, perhaps even a positive feedback. Hayek left us with a “what if” question
and returns us to that initial opening of Pandora’s Box, or perhaps the initial onset
of neo-realism, neo-liberalism, developmentalism, globalism, transnationalism
and other concepts, precepts and adjectives justifying institution building by
bargaining and military force. In terms of new world order, institution building
by necessity requires fundamental changes in governmental structures in nonWestern cultures and nation-states such as China, Afghanistan and Iraq. Such
changes are being prompted by means of political, economic and military powers
of the U.S. and other developed nation-states, and IGOs dominated by developed
nation-states such as the WTO. Though arguably well intended there remains the
question of what will eventually result from the introduction of Western
institutions into non-Western cultures and developing countries.
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CONCLUSION
Although Hayek may have had contrary intentions, his discourse on taxis
and cosmos (Kosmos), and spontaneous order, nonetheless, challenges a modern
Western world to rethink its priorities and policies, and perhaps even foundational
ideologies, especially in the realm of rebuilding non-Western cultures and
developing countries. The contemporary relevance of Hayek’s discourse also
brings one to stark realization of the changing nature of our world, especially in
terms of a post-second world war and post-cold war. For Western society, the old
enemies, that is, Nazism during the Second World War and communism during
the cold war, are no longer at the doorstep. Our past enemies once wore the faces
of Nazism and communism. Samuel Huntington foretold that modern world
reality would displace the ideological conflict of the cold war with cultural
conflict.186 The greatest danger to Western society, if not humankind, would be
Western society’s replacement on the face of its enemy, the face of non-Western
cultures and developing countries.
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